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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the 
competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests that 
powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting 
quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between 
CEO power and firm behaviors. 
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Introduction 
We extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors by examining the impact of CEO 
power on auditor choice. Prior research on CEO power primarily focuses on the economic impact of CEO power, 
such as firm performance and firm valuation. There is no empirical evidence of how CEO power is related to 
specific managerial decisions. In this paper, we explore whether powerful CEOs are more likely to hire big-4 
auditors.  
According to conventional literature of corporate finance (Sydney Finkelstein, 1992), power is defined as “the 
capacity of individual actors to exert their will.” and there are four sources of power: structural power, ownership 
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power, expert power, and prestige power.  Powerful CEOs thus can wield substantial influence over corporate 
decision makings through power embedded in the corporate hierarchy.  
Prior research suggests that too much CEO power exacerbates agency problem as powerful CEOs tend to be 
overconfident and choose risky corporate strategies (Jeffrey Pfeffer, 2010). Bebchuk et al. (2011) provide empirical 
evidence that strong CEO power is also related to economic outcomes related to agency problems. Particularly, there 
are higher odds of the powerful CEOs receiving ‘lucky’ option grants and a higher tendency for powerful CEOs to 
be awarded for luck compensation in the form of positive industry-wide shocks.  Bebchuk et al. (2011) also 
document that strong CEO power lead to lower firm value as measured by Tobin’s q and subpar accounting 
performance. Furthermore, firms with powerful CEOs are more likely to conduct value-destroying acquisitions, 
suggested by substantially negative market reaction to the acquisition announcements. In a similar vein, Liu and 
Jiraporn (2010) suggest that significant stakeholders, such as bondholders, take CEO power into contracting 
consideration. Specifically, banks demand firms with powerful CEOs for significantly higher costs of debt in terms 
of bond yields. Firms with powerful CEOs also incur lower credit ratings, suggesting an unfavorable perception of 
CEO power from the perspective of debtholders. Adams et al. (2005) also explore the impact of CEO power on the 
volatility of firm performance. They argue that powerful CEOs are less likely to share power with other top 
executives who play an important advisory and monitoring role in corporate decision making, which lead to a higher 
likelihood of erroneous decisions from the powerful CEOs. Their empirical findings suggests a positive correlation 
between the volatility of firm performance and the degree of CEO power as the likelihood of erroneous corporate 
decisions increases. Collectively, these empirical evidence indicates that CEO power is a manifestation of agency 
problem and firms with powerful CEOs incur significant economic costs. 
We depart from prior literature examining the economic consequence of CEO power by exploring how CEO power 
may impact a significant financial reporting decision: auditor selection. We specifically examine if firms with 
powerful CEOs are more likely to hire Big-four international auditors.  
Our research is motivated by the competing motives grounded in the agency theory. Prior research suggests that due 
to incentive to protect their reputation and the tremendous litigation risk arising from audit failures, big-4 auditors 
provide better monitoring than non-big-4 auditors (Linda DeAngelo, 1981). Firms with powerful CEOs may be 
reluctant to hire big-4 auditors to improve the financial reporting transparency as powerful CEOs may have 
incentive to garble accounting information about their poor performance. 
One the other hand, there is a countervailing incentive for powerful CEOs to improve accounting transparency by 
hiring big-4 auditors. In an agency conflict setting, insiders may want to hire high quality auditors as a signal of 
higher quality financial reporting so as to obtain favorable contracting terms, such as cost of equity (Joseph Fan and 
T.J. Wong 2005).  Therefore, powerful CEOs would be more likely to hire big-4 auditors to lower the information 
asymmetry to reduce the financing costs. The above arguments render a tension that motivates our empirical pursuit.  
Following Bebchuk et. al (2011), we use CEO pay slice as an empirical proxy of CEO power. The CEO pay slice 
(CPS), calculated as a ratio of total CEO compensation to the total compensation of the top-five executives, captures 
the relative importance of CEO within the C-suite management. This empirical proxy of CEO dominance is tested 
and validated by its significant explanatory power to a rich set of corporate performance variables and other 
corporate outcomes, such as Tobin’s q, accounting profitability, credit ratings and financing costs and is a widely 
accepted and used empirical proxy of CEO power (Bebchuk et. al 2011; Yixin Liu and Pornsit Jiraporn, 2010; 
Pornsit Jiraporn, Pandej Chintrakarn and Yixin Liu 2012).  
We obtain the auditor information of the U.S. firms from the Audit Analytics database and financial information 
from Compustat. Our final sample includes 9,686 observations in total and spans between 1992 and 2011. Our 
empirical analysis suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors.   
Our research makes several contributions to the literature in accounting and finance. First, we are related to the 
literature on CEO characteristics at a general level. Prior studies suggest CEO characteristics are associated with 
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firm performance and firm behaviors, such as overconfidence and narcissism. Our evidence indicates that powerful 
CEOs who dominate corporate decisions in the C-suite groups have significant influence in corporate decisions. 
Second, it contributes to the understanding of the impact of CEO power on firm behaviors. Prior literature suggests 
that CEO power has substantial impact on firm performance and cost of debt (Bebchuk et. al 2011; Liu and Jiraporn, 
2010). We extend this literature by examining the impact of CEO power on auditor selection behavior, which has 
never been explored before. Finally, our studies contribute to the literature of determinants to auditor switching. 
Prior literature has identified several significant determinants to auditor selection, such as firm size, financial 
reporting quality and corporate governance. Our study adds an important dimension to this literature by discovering 
that managerial characteristics may also impact the auditor selection decision.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the sample construction and describes the variables. 
Section III discusses the empirical findings. Finally, Section IV presents the concluding remarks. 
Sample Selection and Research Design 
We obtain the auditor information of the U.S. firms from the Audit Analytics database for the years 2000-2011. We 
then merge with Compustat for firms’ financial information and with ExecuComp for the information of executive 
compensation. We delete firms from the regulated and financial industry as these firms are under a different 
regulation environment. Additionally, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels to 
mitigate the potential outliers' effects. Our final sample includes 9,686 observations in total.  
Prior literature has provided several factors affecting the auditor selection process. In this study, our focus is the 
effect of CEO power on auditor selection. Following Ho and Kang (2013), we perform the following auditor 
selection model using the probit maximum likelihood method:  
  
BIGN = b0 + b1*POWER + b2*SIZE + b3*DA + b4*BM + b5*ROA  
+ b6*CURR + b7*SP + b8*NAS + b9*YEAR + b10*IND + et. 
Where:  
BIGN = 1 if the firm chose a Big N auditor; and 0 otherwise; 
POWER = 
CEO power measured by the CEO's compensation divided by the total compensation of 
the top five executives;  
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
DA = Total long-term debt divided by total assets;  
BM = Book-to-market ratio; 
ROA = Income before interest and taxes scaled by total assets; 
CURR = Total current assets divided by total assets;  
SP = 1 if the firm has a special item; and 0 otherwise;  
NAS = Total non-audit fees to total audit fees; 
YEAR = Dummy variables of year; and 
IND = Dummy variables of industry.  
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The dependent variable (BIGN) is the probability of a firm selecting one of the Big N auditors. The variable of 
interest is the CEO power (POWER). Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), we measure each executive's compensation 
as the sum of all forms of annual pay, including salary, bonus, and other annual pay, plus any restricted stock, stock 
options, long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation. Then we use the percentage of the CEO 
compensation to the total compensation of the top five executives as the proxy of CEO power.1 Compare to the 
traditional proxy of CEO power (i.e. CEO is also the chair of the board), our pay slice measure captures the 
importance of the CEO in the top executive team as well as the ability of the CEO to negotiate their contract.  
Following prior literature (Chaney et al. 2004; Jayne Godfrey and Jane Hamilton 2005; Joanna Ho and Fei Kang 
2013), the control variables in our auditor selection model include measures of firm size, complexity, financial 
health, and auditor-client relationship. Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of the firm's total asset. 
We expect a positive relationship between firms size and Big N auditor given that Big N auditors have more 
capability and resources to handle large clients. We also include the debt-asset ratio (DA) and the book-to-market 
ratio (BM) to capture the business risk of the client. Firms' profitability (ROA) is measure by the earnings before 
interest and taxes scaled by total assets. Firms with low profitability may have high incentives to engage in earning 
management behavior and therefore may influence the auditor selection process. The percentage of current assets to 
total assets (CURR) as well as the special item (SP) is included to indicate the complexity of the client. The 
percentage of non-audit fees to total fees (NAS) is also included to proxy for the auditor-client relationship. Lastly, 
the year dummies and industry dummies are included to control the year and industry effects.  
Empirical Results 
Univariate Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the auditor selection model. The mean of BIGN is 0.955, 
indicating that around 95 percent of firms in our sample is audited by a Big N auditor. This is consistent with the 
results in Joanna Ho and Fei Kang (2013). The average CEO power is 0.388, similar to the mean of 0.357 in 
Bebchuk et al. (2011). The mean and median for the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) are very close (7.403 
and 7.275, respectively), suggesting the measure of size is not skewed. The average long-term debt to total asset 
(DA) and the book-to-market ratio (BM) is 0.173 and 0.469, respectively. Regarding the profitability of our sample 
firms, the mean of ROA is 0.052, with the minimum of -5.779 and the maximum of 0.365. In addition, the average 
current asset to total asset (CURR) is 0.471. Around 75 percent of our sample firms report a special item and the 
average percentage of non-audit fees to total audit fees is 26 percent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Consistent with Bebchuk et al. (2011), we only include firm-years in which CEOs receive the full year compensation. This way 
avoid mechanically decreasing the CEO pay slice based on partial year payment.  
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Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Auditor Selection Model (N = 9,686) 
 Variable Name  Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
 Median  Minimum  Maximum 
           
BIGN  0.955  0.208  1.000  0.000  1.000 
POWER  0.388  0.112  0.393  0.062  0.703 
SIZE  7.403  1.433  7.275  3.274  10.761 
DA  0.173  0.171  0.149  0.000  1.490 
BM  0.469  0.317  0.407  -0.146  1.893 
ROA  0.052  0.133  0.059  -5.779  0.365 
CURR  0.471  0.204  0.466  0.034  0.986 
SP  0.754  0.430  1.000  0.000  1.000 
NAS  0.266  0.216  0.211  0.000  0.812 
 
BIGN = 1 if the firm chose a Big N auditor; and 0 otherwise; 
POWER = CEO power measured by the CEO's compensation divided by the total compensation of the top five 
executives;  
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
DA = Total long-term debt divided by total assets;  
BM = Book-to-market ratio; 
ROA = Income before interest and taxes scaled by total assets; 
CURR = Total current assets divided by total assets;  
SP = 1 if the firm has a special item; and 0 otherwise;  
NAS = Total non-audit fees scaled by total audit fees and non-audit fees; 
YEAR = Dummy variables of year; and 
IND = Dummy variables of industry.  
 
 
The Pearson (Spearman) correlations among the variables in the audit selection model are presented above (below) 
the diagonal in Table 2. The correlation between BIGN and POWER is positive and significant using both the 
Pearson (Corr. = 0.069; p-value < 0.0001) and the Spearman (Corr. = 0.0670; p-value < 0.0001) correlation 
methods, supporting the notion that powerful CEOs are more likely to select Big N auditors. Several correlations 
between the control variables are significant at five percent level, but none of them is higher than 0.500. Therefore, 
it seems that multicollinearity is not an issue in our multivariate regression test. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix among Variables in Auditor Selection Model (N = 9,686) 
 
 BIGN POWER SIZE DA BM ROA CURR SP NAS 
BIGN 1.000 0.069 0.206 0.126 -0.037 -0.032 -0.130 0.097 0.112 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
POWER 0.070 1.000 0.178 0.086 -0.045 0.081 -0.102 0.062 -0.027 
 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.008 
SIZE 0.211 0.223 1.000 0.241 -0.053 0.046 -0.384 0.209 0.028 
 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.006 
DA 0.152 0.132 0.362 1.000 -0.062 -0.121 -0.421 0.146 0.055 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
BM -0.035 -0.057 -0.058 0.013 1.000 -0.220 -0.082 0.089 -0.066 
 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 0.216  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA -0.042 0.074 0.015 -0.257 -0.468 1.000 0.054 -0.142 -0.065 
 <.0001 <.0001 0.135 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CURR -0.129 -0.105 -0.393 -0.495 -0.094 0.147 1.000 -0.106 -0.020 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.045 
SP 0.097 0.077 0.215 0.168 0.099 -0.235 -0.106 1.000 -0.017 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.103 
NAS 0.124 -0.013 0.055 0.065 -0.081 -0.035 -0.028 -0.008 1.000 
 <.0001 0.188 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 0.007 0.452  
Pearson (Spearman) correlations is above (below) diagonal.  
Variable definitions are in Table 1.  
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Multivariate Results 
Table 3 presents the multivariate results on the relationship between auditor selection and CEO power. The coefficient 
on CEO power (POWER) is positive and significant at one percent level (Coeff. = 0.804; P-value = 0.001), indicating 
that firms with a high power CEO are more likely to select Big N auditors. The results suggest that powerful CEOs 
are more likely to decrease the information asymmetry by hiring high quality auditors, with the possible intent to 
signal a high quality financial reporting which lead to a more favorable contracting terms.  
 
Table 3: Probit Regression Results on the Auditor Selection Model (N = 9,686) 
 
  
 
Variables Coefficient P-Value 
   
INTERCEPT -1.229  <.0001 
POWER 0.804  0.001  
SIZE 0.371  <.0001 
DA 0.885  <.0001 
BM -0.385  <.0001 
ROA -0.890  0.003  
CURR -0.641  <.0001 
SP 0.176  0.002  
NAS 0.919  <.0001 
INDUSTRY Yes  
YEAR Yes 
N 9,686 
R-SQUARE 0.08 
Variable definitions are in Table 1.  
For control variables, results suggest that larger firms are more likely to hire Big N auditors. Additionally, firms with 
higher long-term debts, a special item, as well as a higher non-audit fee percentage, also have higher probability to 
hire Big N auditors. On the other hand, the book-to-market ratio, ROA, and current asset ratio are found to be 
negatively related to the selection of a Big N auditor.   
Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. Prior research on CEO power primarily 
focuses on the economic impact of CEO power, such as firm performance and firm valuation. There is no empirical 
evidence of how CEO power is related to specific managerial decisions. We are motivated by the competing financial 
reporting incentives arising from CEO power. One the one hand, powerful CEO may have incentive to choose 
auditors with lower audit quality to garble accounting information. On the other hand, powerful CEOs may be more 
likely to hire high-quality auditors to curry the favor of the outside stakeholders as those auditors provide assurance of 
financial reports. Our empirical finding suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a 
signal of superior financial reporting quality. Our research has implication for the research of how CEO traits impact 
economic outcome. Our research also contributes to the research of auditor choice.  
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